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Lipinski: Exploratory Intangible Drilling and Development Costs: A Tax Ince

EXPLORATORY INTANGIBLE DRILLING AND
DEVELOPMENT COSTS: A TAX INCENTIVE
REINFORCED IN SUN CO. v. COMMISSIONER
I.

INTRODUCTION

Anyone connected with the oil and gas industry would agree that
hydrocarbon production costs are staggering. Developers continually
face increasing overhead in their search for new deposits of petroleum
reserves. One source of relief in this high cost business is the availability of numerous tax deductions.' In addition to the usual business deductions generally available,2 oil and gas developers are granted
further tax relief through provisions designed specifically for the energy
industry.' One such provision is the option to deduct intangible drilling and development costs (IDC).4 The IDC option allows an operator' to deduct these costs as expenses in the current year rather than
depreciate them over several years.6 Costs included are amounts paid

for labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, as well as other intangible
expenditures outlined in the applicable Treasury Regulation.7 "Ex-

pensing" IDCs in this manner provides the operator a substantial deduction in the year the costs are incurred and thus serves as an
incentive for the development of oil and gas properties. Section 263(c) 8

of the Internal Revenue Code empowers the Treasury Secretary to prescribe regulations pertaining to the IDC option; in 1965, the Depart1. For an extensive discussion of tax laws associated with the oil and gas industry, see F.
BURKE & R. BOWHAY, 1982-INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES.

2. See I.R.C. § 162 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3. See F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 1, 1 12.01-17.14.
4. I.R.C. § 263(c) (Supp. V 1981).
5. The Treasury Regulations define an operator as "one who holds a working or operating
interest in any tract or parcel of land either as a fee owner or under a lease or any other form of
contract granting working or operating rights." Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965).
6. Id. Many factors must be considered in making this decision. Among them are the operator's long-range plans for the property in question as well as its potential to produce
hydrocarbons.
If a taxpayer elects to capitalize intangibles and further elects to deduct the cost of dry
holes, the deduction for dry-hole costs is allowed as a loss in the year the dry hole is
completed and abandoned. If the taxpayer elects to expense intangibles [as IDC], such
costs may not also be included in the basis of the property.
F. BURKE & R. BowraY, supra note 1, 14.04, at 1406-07 (footnotes omitted). For a thorough
discussion of relevant factors, see id. %%14.04-.11, at 1406-18.
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965).
8. I.R.C. § 263(c) (Supp. V 1981).
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ment specified when and how the option is available through its
promulgation of Treasury Regulation section 1.612-4. 9 Since then
there have been several disputes regarding the option's applicability in

given situations. This Recent Development will analyze the widening
application of Treasury Regulation section 1.612-4 and discuss its rele-

vance to offshore exploration by examining two recent decisions: Sun
Co. v. Commissioner'° and Gates Rubber Co. v. Commissioner."
II.

IDCs

APPLIED PRIOR TO SuN-A BACKGROUND ANALYSIS

An oil and gas operator must decide whether to capitalize certain

development costs or treat them as expenses under the IDC option. 2
Costs which are eligible for the IDC option include:

[A]mounts paid for labor, fuel, repairs, hauling and supplies,
or any of them, which are used
(1) In the drilling, shooting, and cleaning of wells,

(2) In such clearing of ground, draining, road making,
surveying, and geological works as are necessary in prepara-

tion for the drilling of wells, and
(3)

In the construction of such derricks, tanks, pipe-

lines, and other physical structures as are necessary for the
drilling of wells and the preparation of wells for the produc-

tion of oil or gas. 3

(c) Intangible drilling and development costs in the case of oil and gas wells and geothermal wells.
Notwithstanding subsection (a), regulations shall be prescribed by the Secretary
under this subtitle corresponding to the regulations which granted the option to deduct
as expenses intangible drilling and development costs in the case of oil and gas wells and
which were recognized and approved by the Congress in House Concurrent Resolution
50, Seventy-ninth Congress.
Id

9. Although historically the validity of the IDC option was suspect, the 1954 Internal Revenue Code firmly established IDC as legislative authority. See id For the history of IDC evolution, see Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 553-55 (Ct. Cl. 1976); F. BURKE & R.
BOwHAY, supra note I, 14.02-.03; Posey & Reeves, Intangible Drilling Costs: Offshore Drilling
Dilemma, 31 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 320, 322-25 (1982).
10. 677 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1982).
11. 74 T.C. 1456 (1980), aftdper curiam, 694 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1982).
12. The procedure utilized for making this decision and the ramifications thereof are beyond
the scope of this Recent Development. For an analysis of the criteria for successfully deducting
prepaid IDCs, see Behnke & Gentzler, DeductibilityoftrepaidlntangibleDrillingand Development
Current Review, 17 TULSA L.J. 428 (1982); Burke & Maultsby,
Costs in the Year of Payment-A
EstablishingDeductionsforPrepaidIntangibleDrillingandDevelopment Costs, 28 OIL & GAS TAX
Q. 127 (1979).
For a discussion of the nature of the IDC option, and a flow-chart of the IDC election procedure, see Allbright, An Overview of IntangibleDrillingand Development Costs, 28 OIL & GAS TAX
Q. 283 (1980).
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss3/7

2

Lipinski: Exploratory Intangible Drilling and Development Costs: A Tax Ince
TULSA LAW JOUNAL
[Vol. 18:528

Generally, the option only applies to expenditures for drilling and de'14
veloping items that "in themselves do not have a salvage value.
This salvageability restriction was the subject of litigation in Exxon Corp. v. United States." The Exxon controversy focused upon
whether the expenditures incurred in the construction of offshore platforms were eligible for the IDC option pursuant to section 263(c). 16 In
Exxon, the offshore platforms were partially assembled on land before
being transported to the drilling site. Final preparations were made on
a barge while at sea.17 The costs in question were those for labor, fuel,
repairs, supplies, and hauling, all of which were incurred before removal of the platform from the transport barge. 18 Interpretation and
application of the term "salvage value" became important in determining the applicability of the IDC option. The government contended
that the oil company deducted costs as IDC which, in reality, fell into
three categories, one of which was not deductible as IDC.' 9 Conceding
that (1) expenditures for the construction of structures which in themselves had no salvage value; and (2) expenditures for intangibles
"'used in connection with the installation of physical property which
has a salvage value' 20 both qualified as IDC, the government argued
that acquisition expenditures-intangible costs "'by which the
taxpayer acquires tangible property ordinarily considered as having a
salvage value' " 21 -do not qualify as IDC and must therefore be capitalized.22 The court flatly rejected that position as untenable.23
Following a brief history of the evolution of the IDC option, 24 the
Exxon court stated that because Congress had consistently viewed the
IDC election as an incentive to oil and gas exploration, 2 it followed
that Congress would favor a liberal interpretation of the applicable
14. Id. The regulation goes on to indicate that for IDC option purposes, labor, fuel, repairs,
hauling, and supplies are not considered to have a salvage value even though used in connection
with the installation of tangible property which has a salvage value. Id.
15. 547 F.2d 548 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
16. Id. at 553.
17. Id. at 550.
18. Id. at 551.
19. Id. at 553.
20. Id. (quoting the Service).
21. Id. (quoting the Service) (emphasis added by the court).
22. Id. The government contended that all expenditures made by the taxpayer while the
platform was on land, as well as a portion of those made while the platform was in transit, fell into
this category. Id.
23. Id.
24. See supra note 9.
25. The IDC deduction is an incentive to producers through the substantial tax savings it
provides. Developers are motivated to undertake exploratory ventures because tax costs are

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1982

3

19831

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 3, Art. 7
EXPLORA TOR Y IDCs

Treasury Regulations. 26 Further, the specific terms of the regulation at
issue27 allowed the IDC election for all costs deducted by Exxon.28 Because the only costs at issue in Exxon were intangible expenses which
were incident to and necessary for drilling and because these costs in
and of themselves did not have a salvage value, the court asserted that
"the 'bottom line' has been reached and the matter is at an end."29
Although the government advocated numerous limitations on section
263(c), 30 the court concluded that restrictive interpretation of IDC regulatory language should be disapproved. 31 The opinion firmly sets
forth the basic rule that "optional intangible drilling and development
costs are those expenditures by an oil and gas operator for items which
are incident to and necessary for the drilling of wells and which, when
each is considered individually as a unit in and of itself, have no salvage value."' 32 Finding that all of Exxon's expenditures were "incident
to and necessary for" oil and gas production, and none were for items
which in and of themselves had any salvage value, the court held the
IDC option available.33
greatly reduced after deducting IDCs. Without the IDC option, exploratory costs would often be
prohibitive, particularly those involved with speculative ventures.
26. 547 F.2d at 555. "Congress has consistently viewed the optional treatment of IDC as an
incentive to oil and gas prospecting and exploration .
ld.
I..."
27. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(m)-16 (1951) is the predecessor to Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (1965)
and was in force in 1954, the pertinent taxable year in Exxon. The language in § 1.612-4 is essentially the same today. See Stanton v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 191, 195 n.5 (1967). The
validity of the Exxon decision remains, therefore, unquestioned.
28. Section 39.23(m)-16(a)(1) states in part:
All expenditures made by an operator for wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc.,
incident to and necessary for the drilling of wells and the preparation of wells for the
production of oil or gas, may, at the option of the operator, be deducted from gross
income as an expense or charged to capital account.
Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(m)-16(a)(1) (1951).
The only conditions placed on IDC election are that the costs must have been incurred in the
construction of structures necessary for the drilling and preparation of wells for production, and
that the cost items in and of themselves must not have a salvage value. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6124(a) (1965). Further, the regulation clearly states that "labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc.,
are not consideredas having a salvage value, even though used in connection with the installation
of physical property which has a salvage value." Id. (emphasis added).
29. 547 F.2d at 556.
30. Governmental assertions included a limited interpretation of the word "installation" to
allow IDC deductions only for expenditures incurred at the well site. To this argument, the court
stated that the defendant "has grossly misread its own language." Id. The Service also asserted
that at the moment of an oil or gas "strike," the drilling platform becomes completely salvaged
and therefore "no costs relating to a platform are deductible because they all have salvage value."
Id. at 557 (emphasis in original). The court rejected this conclusion. Id.
31. Id. at 558.
32. Id. (emphasis in original).
33. Id. at 559. The Court was also unconvinced by the Service's "fragmentation" argument.
The Service argued that each operational phase in Exxon should be "fragmented," so that expenditures could be evaluated for IDC purposes at the time they were made. Thus, only those
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Five years later, the Tax Court in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v.
Commissioner34 interpreted Exxon as holding that all onshore costs of
fabricating offshore platforms qualify as IDC.35 In Standard Oil, the
36
taxpayer was engaged in constructing "jacket-type" drilling platforms 37
in the North Sea, and deducted as IDC what it termed "other" costs.
Using arguments similar to the ones it made in Exxon, the Service
urged the court to abandon its former position and narrowly construe
Treasury Regulation section 1.612-4. 38 The court refused to do so and
capsulized the issues as:
(1) Whether the platforms as a whole are ordinarily considered as having a salvage value; and (2) if the answer to (1) is
no, whether the intangible-type costs in issue were expended
to integrate materials which were, prior to such integration,
usable in such a fashion that they would be ordinarily considered as having a salvage value, into components which are,
after such integration, not ordinarily considered as having a
salvage value.39
The StandardOil opinion concluded that the jacket-type platforms in
question are not ordinarily considered to have a salvage value and that
the "other" costs in issue were indeed expended to integrate materials
into finished products which ordinarily do not have a salvage value.4°
These "other" costs were therefore properly deducted as IDC in accordance with Treasury Regulation section 1.612-4.
A review of the Exxon and Standard Oil decisions demonstrates
that the determination of the IDC option's availability hinges on the
salvage value of the items for which expenditures were made. Thus, it
appears that by liberally interpreting Treasury Regulation section
costs incurred at the well site would qualify as IDC. Id. at 556. Justifying its rejection of the
argument, the court stated that the Treasury Regulation was intended to set forth a simple and
basic rule, rather than one which could lead to "ambiguities, overlaps, and problems of categorization." Id. at 558.

34. 77 T.C. 349 (1981).
35. Id. at 387.
36. "Jacket-type" drilling platforms include a deck, the jacket, and pilings. The jacket consists of tubular steel legs which act as support for the deck. Id. at 358.
37. The "other" costs included fuel, labor, repairs, hauling, supplies, and an allocable portion
of overhead. In essence, "other" costs refers to all costs, except those incurred for materials, realized in the construction of offshore drilling equipment. Id. at 361.
38. Id. at 386.
39. Id. at 400-01. It is possible to conclude that IDC election in an onshore operation may be
subject to narrower interpretation than in an offshore context since it is likely that onshore components are far more salvageable than their offshore counterparts. The court, however, did not specifically address this distinction.
40. Id. at 401.
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1.612-4, 4 the courts are moving toward allowance of the IDC deduc-

tion for all development expenses other than costs for materials which
later have a salvage value. Under StandardOil, even costs incurred to
integrate materials which ordinarily have a salvage value into a final
product which is ordinarily not considered to have
a salvage value,
42
such as a drilling platform, are deductible as IDC.

III. SUN CO. AND GATES RUBBER Co. -EXPLORATORY

IDCs

The most recent challenges to the liberalization of the IDC option
have occurred in the context of exploratory operations. The language
of the Internal Revenue Code permits a deduction for "drilling and
development costs" related to oil and gas wells.43 By equating the
Treasury Regulation language "development of oil and gas properties"
with "production," the Service disallowed IDC deductions in those
ventures where there was no intent to produce. 44 Taxpayers have suc45
cessfully challenged the Service's position in Sun Co. v. Commissioner
and Gates Rubber Co. v. Commissioner.'

Sun Company and its affiliates had participated in two separate
ventures: one off the shores of Louisiana; the other in the North Sea.4 7
Both were initially exploratory operations. Sun Company drilled a to41. The Tax Court and the IRS have continually been at odds over the proper interpretation
of Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a). While the court favors allowing the IDC election following the commencement of drilling operations, see Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 325, 353
(1977), the Service seeks to further require demonstration of production intent, see Technical Advice Memorandum No. 7834002, 1978 IRS LET. RUL. (CCH) book 6, fiche 2 (microfiche) (May 3,
1978) (StandardOil (1977) criticized as misreading § 1.612-4(a) by not requiring production intent
as prerequisite for IDC election); Technical Advice Memorandum No. 7837004, 1978 IRS LET.
RUL. (CCH) book 6, fiche 4 (microfiche) (June 9, 1978); Rev. Rul. 80-342, 1980-2 C.B. 99 (IDC
deductions disallowed where wells were drilled solely to obtain geological information).
Thus, despite the Service's desire to restrict the option's availability, it has become clear that
the IDC deduction will be allowed regardless of whether the operator intends to produce. See
Gates Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1456, 1477 (1980), aj'dper curiain, 694 F.2d 648
(10th Cir. 1982); Sun Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1481, 1508-09 (1980), a 'd, 677 F.2d 294 (3d
Cir. 1982).
42. Drilling platforms are, of course, salvageable. However, the costs involved in salvaging
offshore platforms often prohibit the practice. Because the jacket-type drilling platforms at issue
in StandardOil (1981), as well as most other offshore platforms, are disposed of following their
useful lives, they are not ordinarily considered as having a salvage value. 77 T.C. at 401.
43. I.R.C. § 263(c) (Supp. V 1981).
44. See Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965). The Service has long asserted that the IDC option is
not available until an operator decides to produce oil or gas. See supra note 41. Therefore, an
operation at the exploratory stage cannot qualify for the IDC deduction because without a discovery of oil or gas, no intent to produce can be exhibited by a developer. See, e.g., StandardOil
(1977), 68 T.C. at 343.
45. 677 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1982).
46. 74 T.C. 1456 (1980), afdper curiam, 694 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1982).
47. 677 F.2d at 294.
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tal of seventeen exploratory wells, fifteen in the Gulf of Mexico and
two in the North Sea. In the Gulf of Mexico operation, seven of the
fifteen wells drilled encountered hydrocarbons, but all were permanently plugged and abandoned. Some of the remaining eight wells
were dry holes, while others were not drilled to the intended depth due
to mechanical difficulties. After the drilling of these fifteen wells was
completed, Sun established and installed three fixed production platforms from which forty-five production wells were eventually drilled.48
The two wells drilled in the North Sea were both plugged and abandoned, one permanently, the other temporarily; yet no production facility was ever ordered or built in that area.49
In its 1971 tax return, Sun deducted from its gross income its allocable share of the costs incurred from the drilling of the seventeen
wells, claiming the deductions qualified as IDC. The Internal Revenue
Service disallowed the IDC deduction, finding that because the drilling
took place at an exploratory stage and before a decision had been made
to develop the properties, the exploratory costs could not be deducted
as IDC. ° Upon Sun's petition, the Tax Court reversed the IRS ruling,
stating that all drilling costs here involved were deductible as IDC.5 '
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Tax
Court.

2

The Third Circuit indicated that the issue was "whether the costs
of drilling offshore exploratory oil and gas wells from mobile rigs are
deductible . . . as [IDC] under 26 U.S.C. § 263(c) and Treas.Reg.
§ 1.612-4(a)."5 3 Beginning its analysis, the court noted that section
263(a) allows no deductions for costs of" 'permanent improvements or
betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate.' ,54
Although this provision would appear to preclude the IDC deduction
for offshore rigs, 5 the court stated that subsection (c) dealt specifically
with such costs
and exempts them from the general prohibition of sec56
tion 263(a).
Sun recognized that the statutory ancestry of section 263(c) had
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 295-96.
Id. at 296.
Id.
74T.C. 1481.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

677 F.2d at 294.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 296 (quoting I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981)).
Id.
Id.; see supra note 8.
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been questioned, but found that it is today sound authority, fully approved by Congress. 7 There remained, however, a difference of opinion between the Service and the Sun court regarding the IDC option's
applicability to exploratory wells. While section 263(c) appears to allow the IDC deduction without distinguishing between exploratory and
production operations, the Treasury Regulation which gave effect to
section 263(c)58 used more limited language. Treasury Regulation section 1.612-4(a) provides that IDCs incurred by an operator
in the development of oil and gas properties may at his option
be chargeable to capital or to expense. This option applies to
all expenditures made by an operator for wages, fuel, repairs,
hauling, supplies, etc., incident to and necessary for the drilling of wells and thepreparationof wells for theproduction of
oil or gas.59
The Service asserted that this language allows the IDC deduction
only for costs of production, thereby characterizing section 263(c) as
equally narrow. The IRS argued that section 1.612-4(a) makes the IDC
option available only to developmental activities as distinct from exploratory activities. 60 A two-pronged test was developed by the Service
for determining the availability of the IDC option to operators of offshore, wildcat wells, making the option available when:
(1) the cost of the drilling was incurred after a taxpayer
has discovered an oil or gas reservoir and decided to commence production; or
(2) when the taxpayer was drilling "wells" which the
Commissioner defines restrictively as a shaft drilled with the
intention of producing from that shaft any hydrocarbons en57. 677 F.2d at 296-97. The court indicated that the IDC deduction was first promulgated in
Treasury Department regulations in 1918, without reference to any specific enactment by Congress. See Harper Oil Co. v. United States, 425 F.2d 1335, 1338 (10th Cir. 1970). Although
doubts regarding the IDC option's validity later surfaced, see, e.g., F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1945), Congress responded quickly by enacting a resolution which
led to the adoption of§ 263(c). See 677 F.2d at 296. That 1945 Concurrent Resolution states in
part: "ITihe Congress has recognized and approved the provisions of section 29.23(m)-16 of
Treasury Regulations 11 and the corresponding provisions of prior Treasury Regulations granting the option to deduct as expenses such intangibledrillinganddevelopment costs." H.R. Con. Res.
50, 79th Cong., IstSess., 59 Stat. 844 (1945) (emphasis added).
The Sun court highlighted Judge (now Justice) Blackmun's declaration in Harper Oil that
"'[the option, although long possessed of dubious statutory ancestry, now has firm congressional
authority in § 263(c) of the 1954 Code."' 677 F.2d at 297 (quoting HarperOil, 425 F.2d at 1335).
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965).
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. See 677 F.2d at 297. "The dividing line between development and exploration, according
to the Commissioner, is that point at which an operator decides to produce the hydrocarbons that
drilling has discovered or that drilling might encounter." Id.
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countered in commercial quantities.61

The court discounted the Service's interpretation, noting that the
Tax Court has rejected the exploratory/developmental distinction and

the two-pronged test on four separate occasions. 2 Moreover, the Sun
court found that the Service's analysis misread the language of Treasury Regulation section 1.612-4(a), and disregarded
the legislative his6
tory and congressional intent of section 263(c). 1
Section 1.612-4(a) makes no distinction between exploratory and
developmental operations, yet the Service relied on LouisianaLand &
ExplorationCo. v. Commissioner' as authority for the existence of such

a distinction.6 5 In that case, geophysical survey costs were not deductible as expense and were capitalized. 66 Because the Service associated

geophysical surveys with exploration, it asserted in Sun that Louisiana
Land precluded the allowance of a deduction for anything but production or later development CoStS. 67 However, the Third Circuit found
that Louisiana Land identified geophysical work as an initial stage in
property development and distinguished it from both exploratory and
developmental drilling.68 Therefore, Louisiana Land simply did not
apply to the facts in Sun. The court then turned to the Service's argu61. Id. (emphasis in original).
62. Id.; see Sun Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1481 (1980).
[The Service] would deny the IDC option with regard to the intangible costs of drilling
the so-called "exploratory" wells. We could not be more convinced that this chain of
reasoning and its resulting effect are erroneous.
The weak link in [the Service's] theory is the conclusion that "development" occurs
only after a decision to produce.., has been made.
Id. at 1509. The Tax Court used identical language to reject the Service's theory in Gates, 74 T.C.
at 1476.
In Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 325 (1977), the court said:
[The Service] maintains that "development". . . does not begin until an operator
.. makes the decision to commence production drilling.... Until that point is
reached, [it] argues, all costs of exploratory wells must be capitalized.
[The Service's] position finds no support in the language of the regulations or the
relevant authorities and is indeed contrary to both.
Id. at 348.
The fourth rejection of the exploratory/developmental distinction has, according to the Sun
opinion, occurred in Monsanto Company, No. 1417-79 (U.S.T.C. filed Jan. 6, 1982). See 677 F.2d
at 297-98.
63. 677 F.2d at 298.
64. 7 T.C. 507 (1946), af'd, 161 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1947).
65. 677 F.2d at 298.
66. LouisianaLand is, for present purposes, outdated. It was decided long before legislative
recognition of the IDC option and certainly before any judicial liberalization of IDC. The court
did not even use the term "IDC." The issue in LouisianaLand concerned the deductibility of the
costs of geophysical surveys as an ordinary business expense. The opinion defined "geophysical
survey," 7 T.C. at 510, and held that the survey costs were not deductible. Id. at 516.
67. 677 F.2d at 298.
68. Id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1982

9

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 3, Art. 7

19831

EXPLORA TORY IDCs

ment which cited Miller v. United States69 as authority for limiting the
IDC option to wells drilled with an intent to produce hydrocarbons.
Miller, however, was summarily discounted since it dealt with a taxpayer who attempted to deduct as IDCs expenditures incurred while
seeking hot water energy sources. 7 1 The Sun court held that since the
operations in Miller did not relate to oil and gas, as required by both
Treasury Regulation section 1.612-4(a) and Internal Revenue Code
section 263(c), 72 its holding was not controlling.
Finally, the court examined the congressional intent behind section 263(c) and found further justification for rejecting any distinction
between exploratory and developmental costs, as well as the IRS' twopronged test.73 The court noted that the entire legislative history of
section 263(c) indicated that the IDC option was created "as a result of
a continuing Congressional objective to encourage risk-taking with respect to the exploration for, and production of, oil and gas."' 74 The
court cited discussion on the floor of the Senate, when that body was
considering liberalizing the IDC option, which emphasized the high
risk associated with drilling: "'Only one exploratory well in nine produces anything. Eight... are dry holes.. . . Any delay in enacting
this amendment will result in reductions in desperately needed exploratory drilling.'
Because of this legislative history and the consistent
conclusions of other courts and commentators7 6 that the IDC option
was established as an incentive to oil and gas exploration, the court was
not persuaded by the Service's interpretation that the IDC deduction
should be available only after the discovery of recoverable hydrocarbon deposits. 7 7 The court stated that to follow such analysis would be
to allow the IDC option when investment risks are at a minimum, in
",71

69.
70.
71.
72.

78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9127, 41 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 78-324 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
677 F.2d at 299.
Id.
78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) T 9127, at 83,097,41 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 178-324, at 78-380; see

supra notes 8, 59, and accompanying text.
73. 677 F.2d at 299-300.
74. Id. at 300.
75. Id. (quoting 123 CONG. REc. 12,816-17 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen)) (emphasis added by the court).

76. See Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1976); United States v.
Cocke, 399 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1968); Jackson, Tac PlanningBefore Drilling: The Operator's Problen, 27 TUL. L. REv. 21 (1952); Murray, Intangible Drillingand Development Costs of Ol and Gas
Wells, 26 TAXEs 312, 316 (1948). For more recent commentary on IDCs, see articles cited supra
note 12.

77. 677 F.2d at 300.
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contradiction to congressional intent surrounding the deduction. 8 The
Third Circuit was convinced that the relevant authority and accompanying rationale favored allowance of the IDC option in exploratory
energy development. Thus, the Tax Court decision was affirmed. 9
The issue of allowing the IDC option for exploratory drilling was
one of first impression to the Third Circuit, 80* and remained so in the
other circuits until December of 1982, when the Tenth Circuit addressed the question in Gates Rubber Co. v. Commissioner.8 1 In a brief

opinion, that court noted that the Gates issues were "identical" to those
in Sun.2 Gates involved offshore operations in the Gulf of Mexico.8"

After extensive geological and geophysical work was completed and
evaluated, a number of exploratory wells were drilled, five of which

were at issue in Gates.' 4 The IRS argued before the Tax Court that
development does not occur until a decision to produce has been
made,'

and again the court rejected that assertion.

6

The Service

stated that "wells," as defined in Treasury Regulation section 1.6124(a), includes "only those shafts drilled with the intent to produce hydrocarbons."8 " The Tax Court consistently held that "'wells' requires

no finding with regard to any person's intent,"8 8 and that therefore the
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 298.
694 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1982), a~fg 74 T.C. 1456 (1980).

82. The Gales opinion reported by the Tenth Circuit follows in its entirety.
Per Curiam.
In this appeal we are asked to decide whether the costs of drilling offshore exploratory
oil and gas wells from mobile rigs are deductible in the year in which they are incurred
as "intangible drilling and development costs" under 26 U.S.C. § 263(c) and Treas. Reg.
§ 1.612-4(a) ("the IDC option"). The Tax Court ruled in favor of the taxpayer and
against the Commissioner.
All parties agree that the issue in this case is identical with the prior consideration of
this issue by the Third Circuit in Sun Co. v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 294 (3rd Cir. 1982).
The Third Circuit held for the taxpayer. We agree with the Third Circuit.
Affirmed.
Id.
83. 74 T.C. at 1471.
84. Id. at 1471-72.
85. Id. at 1475. The Service contended that, "as a general rule, only the intangible costs of
drilling those shafts drilled after a taxpayer has decided to commence preparing to produce a
reservoir fall within the definition of IDC." Id.
86. Id. at 1476. "The weak link in respondent's theory is the conclusion that 'development'
occurs only after a decision to produce from a particular reservoir has been made." Id. The court
further discounted the Service's position, stating that it "would deny ... the IDC deduction to the
very entrepreneurs for whom it was enacted--those investors who take the enormous risks entailed in drilling the wildcat wells-and would allow the IDC deduction only for those low-risk
wells drilled after the wildcatters had found the oil or gas." Id. at 1477.
87. Id. at 1478.
88. Id. at 1479.
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IDC deduction was available to the taxpayer.89
IV.

ANALYSIS

The IDC option has been the subject of litigation more frequently
due to improper timing than to improper election. 90 The Service's recent challenges to the election have been prompted by its conservative
interpretation of section 1.612-4. The courts have rejected such an approach and clearly favor liberal availability of the IDC deduction.
Two conclusions may be drawn from this review of current law regarding the IDC deduction. First, the term "salvage value" will be given a
broad interpretation, thereby allowing IDC election for virtually all
drilling and development expenditures other than materials and equipment. 91 Courts may allow expenditures for materials integrated into a
finished product which has no salvage value to be expensed as IDCs. 92
Second, the IDC election is available to taxpayers involved in
either exploratory or producing operations which pertain to oil and gas
development. Purely "wildcat" ventures are apparently included in
this category based on the rationale in Sun. Since both of the circuit
courts that have reviewed this issue consistently extended IDC availability to offshore, exploratory operations, it is likely that other circuits
will follow suit under similar facts.
The Sun and Gates holdings are sound decisions. Embodying the
intent behind section 263(c), they reaffirm necessary incentives for oil
and gas developers. Due to the high risk nature of exploratory operations, as well as the staggering costs associated with such wildcat ventures, it is only proper that substantial tax relief be granted in the form
of the IDC option. Sun and Gates are significant steps in that direction.
V.

CONCLUSION

The option to expense intangible drilling and development costs
89. Id. at 1480.
90. See, ag., Pauley v. United States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)

9280, 11 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)

63-490 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Keller v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 7 (1982) (appeal filed 8th Cir.); see also
Behnke & Gentzlersupranote 12 (guidelines for deducting prepaid IDCs in the year of payment).

91. For a non-inclusive list of expenditures within the IDC election, see F. BURKE & R.
BowHAY, supra note 1, 14.12, at 1420-21.
92. See Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349,400 (1981). But Sf. Harper Oil
Co. v. United States, 425 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1970). There, the cost of surface casing for producing wells could not be expensed as IDC, but had to be capitalized even though Oklahoma Corpo-

ration Commission regulations prohibited casing removal, thus rendering it unsalvageable. Id. at
1341-42.
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can only be deemed a necessity for oil and gas developers. Although
suspect as a valid deduction in the early part of this century, the IDC
option has evolved into a firmly established tax incentive for the energy
industry. The consistency with which the Tax Court has liberally applied section 1.612-4(a) indicates its concurrence with the congressional
intent behind the IDC deduction. The Internal Revenue Service has,
with equal consistency, sought to narrowly construe the IDC option
and to preclude its application to exploratory ventures. The Sun and
Gates appeals represent an affirmation of the Tax Court's liberal view.
If the IDC option is to be a true tax incentive, its election must be
available to developers engaged in exploratory as well as producing
operations. The opinions issued by the circuit courts in Sun and Gates
not only support this premise, but also decisively overrule the Service's
narrow perspective.
Matthew E Lipinski
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